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ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF AND FOR
PERSISTENT OBJECTION
DINO KRITSIOTIS*
INTRODUCTION
The inspiration for recent interrogations into the possibilities of
withdrawing from international custom emanate from an anonymous
judge’s observation of the abilities that States have to exit from “unwritten
and un-negotiated” rules of customary international law: “Why are nations
often allowed to withdraw unilaterally from treaties, which are expressly
negotiated and usually written down, but are never allowed to withdraw
from unwritten and un-negotiated [customary international law] rules?”1
Contained within this statement is the ready parity that the judge infers (or
seeks to infer) from the making of public international law via custom as
opposed to via convention, and on the apparent disparity that exists within
that conceptual framework when comparing one formal source of public
international law with another. Yet, entrenched within the self-same
statement are claims that attempt to relate other differences that exist
between custom and convention—the idea of the making of custom as a
diffuse and “un-negotiated” exercise, and of its product being lex non
scripta, whereas conventions, by comparison, are “expressly negotiated and
usually written down”2—to the point where it is legitimate to ask whether
rightful analogies can be drawn at all between and among the formal

* University of Nottingham.
1. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120
YALE LAW J. 202 (2010).
2. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties confines itself to “international
agreement[s] concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever [their] particular
designation.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. However, some have argued that there is no reason in
principle to disqualify unwritten agreements from consideration as treaties “[p]rovided [that] the text
can be reduced to a permanent, readable form (even if this is done by down-loading and printing out
from a computer).” ANTHONY AUST, MODERN LAW AND TREATY PRACTICE 19 (2d ed. 2007).
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sources of public international law as enunciated in Article 38 (1) of the
1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice.3
In this short article, a rejoinder to the important call for a theoreticallyinformed discourse on the coherence of these formal sources as itemized in
the Statute of the Court, we shall consider this provision of the Statute from
the optic of generality—and assess the extent to which this might affect our
understanding of how notions of consent and consensus impact and should
impact the making of public international law.4 We allude to the separate
enquiries examining the basis of obligation in public international law, as
attentions are focused on the construction of persistent objection in the
context of custom and what this might tell us about any unified theory
connecting the formal sources of the discipline—aware of the health
warning once issued against a narrow interpretation of Article 38 (1) of the
Statute of the Court, that public international law “has to be identified by
reference to what the actors (most often States), often without benefit of the
pronouncement of the International Court of Justice, believe normative in
their relations with each other.”5 Some attempt is made to address the
limitations on the possibilities of persistent objection in view of the current
and continuing significance of the consent of States in this exercise,6
before, in the penultimate section of the article, we emphasize a contextual
appreciation of the formal sources of public international law as they
appear in the Statute of the Court, based on their distinctiveness of function
and respective histories and associations.7
I. THE OPTIC OF GENERALITY
It is worthwhile exploring Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice from the optic of generality, since that

3. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans
1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
4. See generally ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
157-60 (2007).
5. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 18
(1994). For a contemporary application of this approach, see also CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF
PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX PACIFICATORIA (2008). This observation gains special
resonance when it is viewed against Art. 34 (1) of the Court’s Statute—that “[o]nly States may be
parties in cases before the Court.” See ICJ Statute, supra note 3. To be sure, the Statute does provide for
the advisory competence of the Court: Art. 65. See id.; see also U.N. Charter art. 96.
6. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 213-14.
7. For a classic statement on the individuality and interrelation of the formal sources of public
international law, consider Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom,
Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1988). See also Frederick Pollock,
The Sources of International Law, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 511 (1902).
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provision invokes the notion of “generality” at several intervals, but it does
so in senses that cannot be assumed to be identical with one another. It will
be recalled that this provision instructs the Court to apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.8

Distinctions do need to be drawn here on the meanings of generality
because a close reading of this aspect of the Statute will reveal that there
are at least three separate connotations awarded to the notion of generality
that appear in Article 38 (1) (a) through (c) of the Statute.9 The provision
commences its itemization of the formal sources of public international law
with international conventions, “whether general or particular,” thus
referring to their specific materia and, in consequence we can presume, to
their potential and ultimate geographic reach.10 Article 38 (1) (a) maintains,
however, that irrespective of their general or particular character, such

8. Amongst other things, this excerpt appears as Art. 38 (1) of the Statute. Art. 38 (2) announces
that this provision “shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the
parties agree thereto” and the reference in Art. 38 (1) (d) of the Statute is to another aspect of the Statute
in Art. 59 which provides that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.” ICJ Statute, supra note 3.
9. We shall set aside Art. 38 (1) (d) for it concerns judicial decisions and the teaching of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations as a means for the determination—and not the
creation—of rules of law, and “subsidiary means” for the determination of rules of law at that. As Sir
Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts remark, “[a]lthough Article 38 does not in terms state that it
contains the formal sources of international law, it is usually inferred.” See I OPPENHEIM’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE (§9) 24 [hereinafter OPPENHEIM’S] (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
10. See Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 677, 746-48 (Andreas Zimmerman, Karin Oellers-Frahm & Christian Tomuschat eds.,
2006). See also Alan Boyle, Further Development of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Mechanisms for Change, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 40, 46–47 (David
Freestone, Richard Barnes & David M. Ong eds., 2006). There is no reason to doubt the usefulness of
this mode of analysis for customary international law: as the International Court of Justice found in
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, “that in customary
international law, whether of a general kind or that particular to the inter-American legal system, there
is no rule permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by the State
which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack.” See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 105 (§199) (June 27). At another
point, the Court spoke of “the existence, and the acceptance by the United States, of a customary
principle which has universal application.” Id. at 107 (§204). See also Pellet, supra note 10, at 762–64.
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conventions shall establish rules that are “expressly recognized” by the
contesting States—an explicit testament to the significance that consent has
in the making of public international law via convention, as confirmed by
the doctrine of the privity of treaties in Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.11
This, then, is quite different to the sense in which the notion of
generality is summoned in Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute concerning
international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,”12
where it serves as an approximate quantification—and only an approximate
quantification—of the amount of practice that is necessary for an
international custom to occur.13 The idea of “general practice” therefore
goes to the required quantum of that practice; it advises that a unanimous
practice of States14 accepted as law—that is, of an express consent of all
States—need not exist, or, at least, it need not be demonstrated before the
Court, in order for an international custom to be said to exist. Generality is
therefore pedalled into service on this front not in respect of the content or
geographic reach of a given rule, but, rather, as a means of identification of
the extent of the empirical foundations that are envisaged by the Statute for
a rule of international custom to be brought into being. We can appreciate
why this might well have been the case at the time of the adoption of the
United Nations Charter; indeed, it has been observed that the proliferation

11. VCLT, supra note 2, at art. 34 (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
State without its consent.”). Hugh Thirlway notes that there are “two apparent exceptions to this
principle—but they are only apparent.” One concerns an obligation contained in a treaty that becomes
part of custom; the other concerns the acceptance of a State not a party to a treaty of “an obligation
stated in the treaty, or to derive a benefit from the treaty” if all States concerned agree to that
arrangement. See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 120
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006). Importantly, article 34 of the Vienna Convention denotes this rule
as a “general”—not an “absolute”—rule concerning third States. See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD
PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23–51 (1993).
12. An unfortunate turn of phrase given that “it is custom that is the source applied, and that it is
practice which evidences custom.” See HIGGINS, supra note 5, at 18; see also R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V.
LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 7 (3d ed. 1999).
13. R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 HAGUE RECUEIL 25, 67 (1970). Though Akehurst has
argued that this does not necessarily entail a relaxed approach to the formation of custom, since the
International Court of Justice has adopted a “stringent” requirement for general practice in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases in its requirement of “extensive and virtually uniform practice” on behalf
of States, including those whose interests have been specially affected. See Michael Akehurst, Custom
as A Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 17 (1974) (“If the case had involved, not
the transformation of a treaty provision into customary law, but the creation of custom in some other
way, it is possible that the Court would not have laid down such a stringent requirement.”). See also
Louis B. Sohn, “Generally Accepted” International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986).
14. See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 4, at 41 (noting the qualification for States and that such is
not the stipulation spelt out in Art. 38 (1) (b) of the Statute).
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of States in the period after the Second World War “has made it harder and
harder to discern unanimous patterns.”15 Nevertheless, we are still left to
decipher whether, as it is put in the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s
International Law, “[c]ustom is itself a matter of general rather than
universal consent,”16 or whether the premise of international custom is, in
actual fact, the consent of States no matter whether this is issued on an
express or presumed basis.17
The third and final sense of generality to emerge from Article 38 (1) of
the Statute relates to its reference to “general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations.” Here, the sense of generality that is conveyed relates
to the very character of the legal proposition that is at stake: we are dealing
with a “principle” of law, but it is a “general principle” that we are (or
ought to be) concerned with.18 The common inference that is made of this
aspect of Article 38 (1) of the Statute is that it “enables” the International
Court of Justice to make use of principles that can be characterized as
“general” in nature, principles (such as estoppel and natural justice) that
might not otherwise find the requisite degree of State support as a matter of
international custom,19 and which facilitate the completeness of the system
of public international law for the purposes of adjudication.20 The scope for
non liquet is thereby minimized.21

15. Detlev F. Vagts, International Relations Looks At Customary International Law: A
Traditionalist’s Defence, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1031, 1039 (2004).
16. OPPENHEIM’S, supra note 9, at 24 (§9). Bradley & Gulati remind us of the first edition of
Oppenheim, published in 1905, and its mentioning of the concept of “common consent.” See Bradley &
Gulati, supra note 1, at 227. However, see infra discussion accompanying notes 25 and 26.
17. Note the emphasis placed on formal consent for custom in H.C.M. Charlesworth, Customary
International Law and the Nicaragua Case, 11 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 3, 11 (1984-1987). See also
Thirlway, supra note 11, at 121-22 (“[o]ne approach is to regard all custom as a form of tacit
agreement”) and id. at 125; see also the discussion of Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 222-24.
18. See Pellet, supra note 10, at 767 (“there can be no doubt that, when associated with ‘general’
the word ‘principle’ implies a wide-ranging norm”); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (7th ed. 2008).
19. See VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (2007). Jennings posits that some have been
prone to regard this aspect of Article 38 (1) of the Statute as “a sort of comparative lawyer’s charter.”
See Robert Y. Jennings, What Is International Law and How Do We Tell it When We See It?, 37
ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INT’L 59, 72 (1981). For Henkin, this is “a source available only as
necessary for interstitial use, to fill out what international law requires but has not been recognized as
customary law because it has not yet been invoked often and widely enough.” LOUIS HENKIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 40 (1995).
20. See Pellet, supra note 10, at 765 (though advising, at 766, that the Court has referred to Art. 38
(1) (c) of its Statute “with an extreme parsimony”).
21. See Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet and the Incompleteness of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 153, 166
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999). See also Pellet, supra note 10, at 764–
65.
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That said, in a faint echo of what the Statute provides for international
custom, there might be some sense that these general principles derive their
authority from the general practice of States in that they are recognized by
some (and not necessarily all) “civilized nations” (whosoever those might
be).22 This would present generality with a double significance when it
comes to Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute, which would not only describe
the character of the principle that is in issue in a particular case, but which
would also speak to the scope of State validation that is necessary for such
principles to be properly so-called and, ultimately, to exist as a form of
public international law. So, for instance, Karen Knop has compared the
general principles of law offered by Sir Humphrey Waldock in his general
course on public international law at the Hague Academy of International
Law in 1962,23 with the separate opinion of Vice-President Christopher J.
Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice in Case Concerning the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project of September 1997, when advancing the
principle of sustainable development. Her reflection is that:
In comparison with what Waldock describes, Vice President
Weeramantry’s is a much more thoroughgoing attempt to establish the
generality of general principles of law. His examples suggest an effort
to correct as the judge sees fit for historical and cultural biases. They
encompass the past as well as and even in contrast to the present;
cultures as opposed to just states; living law as opposed to exclusively
written; underlying cultural values as well as the legal rules they

22. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 208. It is interesting to observe that Art. 38 (1) (c)
refers to “civilized nations,” whereas Art. 38 (1) (d) mentions “the various nations.” See ICJ Statute,
supra note 3.
23. See Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 HAGUE RECUEIL
1, 66 (1962). For Waldock, two principles underpinned the concept of general principles of law:
First, by the accidents of history, some of the principal European systems of law have
penetrated over large areas of the globe, mixing in greater or less degree with the indigenous
law and often displacing it in just those spheres of law in which we have seen that
international law has most readily borrowed from domestic law. In consequence, there is a
much larger unity in the fundamental concepts of the legal systems of the world to-day than
there might otherwise have been . . . Secondly, it was never intended under paragraph (c) [of
Art. 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice] that proof should be furnished
of the manifestation of a principle in every known legal system . . . and certainly it has never
been the practice . . . . Truth to tell, arbitral tribunals, which usually consist of one, three or
five judges, have probably done no more in most cases than take into account their own
knowledge of the principles of the systems in which the arbitrators were themselves trained,
and these would usually have been Roman law, Common law, or Germanic systems.
Id. For Knop, “[p]ut differently, either non-Western legal systems are simply not factored into general
principles of law because the judges rely on their own, usually Western backgrounds as representative,
or non-Western legal traditions are modified and thus more insidiously excluded by ‘the accidents of
history’ sometimes known as imperialism.” Karen Knop, Reflections on Thomas Franck, Race and
Nationalism (1960): “General Principles of Law” and Situated Generality, 35 N.Y. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 437, 457 (2003).
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validate. Indeed, Vice President Weeramantry applies to a Communistera engineering project in central Europe environmental wisdom that
he seeks to show has been law for centuries in non-European, and once
in European, parts of the world.24

II. THE CONSTRUCTION OF PERSISTENT OBJECTION
As outlined here, the formal sources of public international law
introduce us to the range of modalities that exist for the making of public
international law in present times, which need to be distinguished from
what has been called the basis of obligation within public international
law—as reflected in “the common consent of the international
community.”25 Article 38 (1) of the Statute thus articulates—in an
unspecific way truth be told, but, nevertheless, it articulates—the rules in
respect of each of these formal sources of law and legal obligation, and, as
such, it casts a certain impression of the greater or lesser extent to which
each formal source comports with the basis of the discipline.26 Our
interpretations must therefore observe the connectability of each of these
formal sources to the agreed underpinnings of the system—of the exact
extent to which consent is supposed to inform the making of international
conventions, international custom, as well as general principles of law—
while we remain conscious, of course, that the foundations of the system
were set well before all States were able to, or allowed to, or in existence in
order to, issue their respective consents on how the primary rules of public
international law could and should be made.27 Whereas the narrative for
some States might well therefore be the constitutionalization of consent to

24. Knop, supra note 23, at 458–59 (opposing Waldock’s position that “it was never intended . . .
that proof should be furnished of the manifestation of a principle in every known legal system”)
(emphasis added). Note the concerns regarding subjectivity in the process that produced the predecessor
to Art. 38 (1) (c) on general principles of law in 1920 by the Advisory Committee of Jurists. See Pellet,
supra note 10, at 765.
25. See OPPENHEIM’S, supra note 9, at 23 (§8) (“The sources of law . . . concern the particular
rules which constitute the system, and the processes by which the rules become identifiable as rules of
law. The sources of the rules of law, while therefore distinct from the basis of law, are nevertheless
necessarily related to the basis of the legal system as a whole.”). See also id. at 14-16, 24 (§9).
26. See id. at 24 (§9) (“The sources set out in Article 38 are, in fact, such as will ensure the
conformity of the resulting rules as a whole with that common consent of the international community
which is the basis of international law.”); J.L. Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law, in
THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS 1 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht &
C.H.M. Waldock eds., 1958); P.E. Corbett, The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of
Nations, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 20 (1925); Oscar Schachter, Towards A Theory of International
Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 300, 301-02 (1968).
27. Consider the important discussion of Lowe on the connectability of primary and secondary
rules of obligation. See A.V. Lowe, Do General Rules of International Law Exist?, 9 REV. INT’L
STUDIES 207, 208–09 (1983).
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greater or lesser degrees for the making of all public international laws, for
other States the narrative is sure to be or to seem otherwise—that is one of
a fated and projected normativity, of yesterday’s rules presented as faits
accomplis and established propositions, remote from any sustained notion
of, or commitment to, the constitutionalization of consent.28
Be this as it may, it is appropriate for us to enquire whether the formal
sources of law are governed by separate logics and logistics of operation. Is
the omission of any requirement for express recognition in Article 38 (1)
(b) of the Statute for the making of international custom intended to be
meaningful and relevant? Are we meant to deduce anything significant
about the function of consent in the making of international custom when
compared with that for international conventions? Without more, one can
see how a literal reading of the Statute could lead one to this sobering
conclusion,29 but it is through the jurisprudence of the International Court
of Justice that we have developed a heightened sensitivity to the
possibilities of and for persistent objection in public international law—
and, with it, the significance that consent has in the formation of
international custom.30 So, in its first decision on the matter, in the Asylum
Case of November 1950, the Court found that no custom existed on the
rule concerning unilateral and definitive qualification of offences eligible
for asylum—but it went on to say that “even if it could be supposed that
such a custom existed between certain Latin American States only, it could
not be invoked against Peru which, far from having its attitude adhered to
it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the
Montevideo Conventions [on Political Asylum] of 1933 and 1939, which
were the first to include a rule concerning the qualification of the offence in

28. Such is the “paradox” of consent. See A.V. Lowe, Preface, in MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE
DECOLONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATE SUCCESSION AND THE LAW OF TREATIES v (2007).
But see Thirlway, supra note 11, at 122 (observing that the clean-slate theory for decolonized States
was “later quietly abandoned by its adherents”); Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in
Respect to Treaties art. 16, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 (“A newly independent State is not bound
to maintain in force, or to become a party to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the
succession of States the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States
relates.”).
29. Cf. Lowe, supra note 27, at 208–09 (presenting the relationship between the general practice
of States for the making of international custom and the concept of consent of States as one of
reconciliation).
30. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 541 (1993) (“All
arguments supporting the persistent objector rule are based on the view that international law is the
product of the consent of states.”).
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matters of diplomatic asylum.”31 Just over a year later, in December 1951,
the Court ruled in the Fisheries Case that the ten-mile rule for the closing
lines of bays “would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch
as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian
coast.”32
For the Court, therefore, these cases were both about the actualization
of persistent objection in practice,33 or of “putting States outside the
binding force of the rule.”34 Both Peru and Norway were bound together in
a sort of thematic unity as choice practitioners of persistent objection, even
though the Court had found in each case that the rule in question—that is,
the target of the respective persistent objections—possessed insufficient
empirical foundations to command the force of law. A custom, or
customary rule, as argued by Colombia and the United Kingdom
respectively, did not therefore exist in the first place according to the
Court—and even if the said rules had indeed come into existence,
continued the Court in obiter dicta that were remarkably reminiscent of one
another, neither would have been capable of binding its respective
persistent objectors. Though the Court did not impart the precise
requirements necessary for a successful persistent objection to occur, it is
implicit from the jurisprudence of the Court that it relied on a certain
construction of what was entailed by this process—that the persistent
objector would need to ensure that its objections are made known
simultaneous to formation of a given rule,35 and that there must be some
(though unspecified) durability to the objections that have been made (for
Norway, the Court said, had “always opposed” the rule under discussion).36
Objections must therefore be properly and appropriately timed, and they

31. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277–78 (Nov. 20). As the Court pointed out,
the 1933 Convention had at that point in time only been ratified by not more than eleven States; the
1939 Convention by two States only. Id. at 277.
32. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18).
33. See generally Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. 266; Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116; see also North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. of Ger. v. Den.; Fed. Rep. of Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 27
(Feb. 20) (observing that “as soon as concrete delimitations of North Sea continental shelf areas began
to be carried out, the Federal Republic [of Germany] . . . at once reserved its position with regard to
those delimitations which (effected on an equidistance basis) might be prejudicial to the delimitation of
its own continental shelf areas”).
34. See Lowe, supra note 27, at 208.
35. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 11-12 (stating that there can be no subsequent persistent
objection, i.e. persistent objection subsequent to the formation of a given rule). But see Andrew T.
Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 170 (2005).
36. See generally Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. 266; see also Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 131.
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must be, in a manner of speaking, persistent; we can safely assume that
sporadic or isolated objections will not do.37
The persistent objections of both Peru and Norway on these occasions
also had the effect of grounding the Court’s scepticism of the advent of the
international custom alleged before it: in the Asylum Case, the Court
formed the view that the facts brought to its knowledge “disclose so much
uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the
exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on
various occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid
succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected
by others, and the practice has been so much influenced by considerations
of political expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern
in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to
the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence”;38
likewise, in the Fisheries Case, the Court had discerned too many vagaries
in the practice of States from where it was standing.39 In other words, in
both sets of circumstances, the presence of persistent objection had served
to underscore the disparities that were deemed to have riddled the practice
before the Court but, as we have also found, the legal significance of a
finding of persistent objection was more than that, at least in theoretical
terms. According to the Court, even if the practice of States had been
sufficient to tide a given rule past the requisite threshold of empirical
foundation, that rule would not have (and, in the Court’s reckoning, could
not have) bound the persistent objector for the want of or the withholding
of its consent. The value of the identification of persistent objection,
therefore, is that it confers on the persistent objector State the status of not
being bound by the rule to which it has given persistent objection—as and
when that rule does command the force of law.40
Stated in these terms, it is clear that this construction of persistent
objection relies on the temporal arc of a given rule—charting its lifespan,
as it were—in order that the period for permissible persistent objection can

37. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 211 (“Persistent objection must involve affirmative
international communications, not mere silence or adherence to contrary laws or practices, and there are
few examples of agreed-upon successful persistent objection”).
38. See Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 266.
39. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 131 (“[T]he Court deems it necessary to point out that
although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in their national law and in their
treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral tribunals have applied it as between these States,
other States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the
authority of a general rule of international law.”).
40. See Lowe, supra note 27, at 208.
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be appropriately identified and made known: this must occur at some point
from the perceived conception of the aforementioned rule right through to
the moment of its crystallization as custom.41 These markings on that arc—
at the points of conception and crystallization of the aforementioned rule—
might appear problematic terms to say the least and to provoke more
questions than they are able to answer, but, in the absence of any further
detailed instruction, they do provide a rough and ready field guide to the
essential manifestations of persistent objection in practice. It is for this
reason that we find analysis of persistent objection often interposed against
“a developing rule of customary law,”42 or, at other times, against so-called
“emerging” customary international law.43 That, then, is the function of
these idioms of developing or emerging custom: it is to demarcate when the
possibilities of persistent objection must be realized, seized and acted upon
by States; it is not to suggest that there is any difference in legal terms
between the position of non-persistent objector States and persistent
objector States to a given rule at any point during its formation. That
difference would only obtain after the formation or crystallization of a rule,

41. See Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. 266 and Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116. See also Bradley &
Gulati, supra note 1, at 210 (discussing when the space between the point of conception of a rule and its
crystallization might be unusually short or what has been described as “instant”); Bin Cheng, United
Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23,
37 (1965) (suggesting as an instance of instant international customary law General Assembly
Resolutions 1721 (XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961) and 1962 (XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963) on outer space when, he
writes, “there is no reason why an opinio juris communis may not grow up in a very short period of time
among all or simply some Members of the United Nations with the result that a new rule of
international customary law comes into being among them” and “there is also no reason why they may
not use an Assembly resolution to ‘positivize’ their new common opinio juris”). Perhaps another
example of this phenomenon in action could derive from the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples, G.A. Resn. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960), U.N.
G.A.O.R. 15th Sess., Supp. 16, at 66, in which the General Assembly declared (in the fifth operative
paragraph) that “[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those
territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and
desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete
independence and freedom.” It is the timing of action which the Resolution emphasizes for the
realization of decolonization that is of interest to us here. See KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELFDETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 74−75 (2002). See also D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (7th ed., 2010).
42. See Akehurst, supra note 13, at 26.
43. See Lowe, supra note 27, at 207. See also Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 236 (“an
emerging [customary international law] rule”).
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so that we can tabulate the separate legal consequences for non-persistent
objector and persistent objector States thus:44
Emerging Custom
Non-Persistent Objector State

( x ) Not Bound

Established
Custom
( √ ) Bound

Persistent Objector State

( x ) Not Bound

( x ) Not Bound

This diagrammatic representation of the legal significance of
persistent objection is not, however, complete, since it does not factor into
its findings the legal position of the persistent objector State in respect of
peremptory norms of public international law, or jus cogens.45 Can a State
enter persistent objections to a rule of this designation or character? It will
be recalled that such rules are defined in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties as those “accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole [and] from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character.” This
statement is important because of the extent to which it defines jus cogens

44. Were it at all otherwise, the legal significance of persistent objection would be reflected on the
front of emerging custom—and not, as is represented in tabulated form above, on the front of
established custom. Contra Lowe, supra note 27, at 208. On this account of things, the non-persistent
objector State and persistent objector State alike would be bound by established custom, but,
additionally, the non-persistent objector State would be bound by emerging custom, whereas, in direct
consequence of its persistent objection, the persistent objector State would not be. If this were so, the
non-persistent objector State would therefore be bound in equal terms by both emerging as well as
established custom, in a version of persistent objection that could be rendered thus:

Non-Persistent Objector State
Persistent Objector State

Emerging Custom
(√ ) Bound
( x ) Not Bound

Established Custom
( √ ) Bound
( √ ) Bound

But can this really be so? Does it not credit “emerging custom” with an authority that it does not really
deserve? Is it at all proper to equate emerging custom with established custom in this way? If not, what,
then, is the exact utility of the concept of “emerging custom”? As a descriptive rather than normative
device—but descriptive of what exactly? A harbinger of future normative change—a sign of things to
come perchance—and no more? Could it not therefore form part of the phenomenon to which we now
attach the appellation of “international soft law”? Accord C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law:
Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989).
45. See John Tasioulas, Customary International Law and the Quest for Global Justice, in THE
NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 307, 310
(Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007).
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by reference to general international law,46 so that candidates for jus cogens
would appear to be forthcoming from that pool of existing norms that can
already claim the status of general international law, or of custom.47
Furthermore, as far as the Vienna Convention is concerned, we have a
clear sense that the consent of each and every State is not required for the
making of jus cogens, because what matters for rules of that character is the
acceptance and recognition of each of these rules by (in the words of the
Convention) the international community of States as a whole.48 The fact
that rules of jus cogens status do not admit any derogation—the Vienna
Convention is quite categorical on this point, even though its travaux
préparatoires might not spell out the full implications of this position—
distinguishes such rules from rules of international custom, and provides
commanding evidence of a limitation on the possibilities for persistent
objection in public international law: “The very concept of jus cogens
makes it reasonable to argue that peremptory rules do not admit of any
persistent objection. If the purpose of peremptory rules is to allow the
common interest of States to prevail over the conflicting interest of a single
State or a small number of States, this purpose would be frustrated if that
State or a small number of States were allowed to escape the application of

46. VCLT, supra note 2, at art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law.”) (emphasis added). See also id. at art. 64
(concerning the emergence of “a new peremptory norm of general international law”, when “any
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”) (emphasis added).
47. But see, e.g., Jacob Werksman & Ruth Khalastchi, Nuclear Weapons and Jus Cogens:
Peremptory Norms and Justice Pre-empted, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 181, 188 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds.,
1999) and Mary Ellen Turpel & Philippe Sands, Peremptory International Law and Sovereignty: Some
Questions, 3 CONNECTICUT J. INT’L L. 364 (1988).
48. An observation that cannot be overstated: see James Crawford, Responsibility to the
International Community As A Whole, 8 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 303 (2001) and Juan
Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of A Hierarchy of Norms in International Law, 8
EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 583, 588 (1997). However, note that:
[A]ll states consent to a secondary rule of law-creation which deems all states which have not
persistently objected to an emerging (i.e., substantive) rule of law to be bound by it, without
being at all concerned with the question [of] whether or not such states consent to the primary
rule, whenever the primary rule is “generally accepted” by states. Here the consensual nature
of international law is preserved in the requirement of consent to the secondary rule, although
it is excluded in the case of the primary rule.
Cf. Lowe, supra note 27, at 208 (comparing the construction of custom). A similar line of reasoning,
that of attenuated consent, could be adopted as the basis of the secondary rule governing the creation of
jus cogens—States who are parties to the Vienna Convention are bound by its terms, including Arts. 53
and 64—except that the concept of jus cogens does not admit persistent objection, infra notes 49 and
50; note, too, that the concept has been described as “one that is not widely endorsed by State practice.”
See Dinah Shelton, International Law and “Relative Normativity”, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 159, 164,
166 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2006). Cf. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 212 (conceiving norms of jus
cogens as arising from “nearly universal practice”).
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a peremptory rule on the ground of persistent objection.”49 Others have
written of how the “primary purpose” of jus cogens would appear to be “to
override the will of persistent objectors to a norm of customary
international law.”50 Given this state of affairs, a more complete tabulation
of the possibilities for, as well as the limitations of, persistent objection
might well be set out in the following terms:

Non-Persistent
Objector State
Persistent Objector
State

Emerging
Custom
( x ) Not
Bound
( x ) Not
Bound

Established
Custom
( √ ) Bound

( √ ) Bound

( x ) Not Bound

( √ ) Bound

Jus Cogens

III. A CONTEXTUAL APPRECIATION OF THE FORMAL SOURCES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The focus on the formal sources of public international law as
analogous sources, one directly comparable to the other, tends to detract
from the view which emphasizes the distinctiveness of each of these formal
sources in terms of their respective function and histories,51 but also, and in
turn, their interaction with one another in the overall scheme of things. It
has been appropriately observed that the formal sources in the Statute of
the International Court of Justice “are not self-contained but interrelated,
and each source gives rise to rules which have to be understood against the
background of rules deriving from other sources, so that any nonconsensual element in one source of law may indirectly affect the rules
deriving from other sources.”52 We might term this a contextual
appreciation of Article 38 (1) of the Statute, and of the functioning of the
formal sources in practice, and it is evident from the four Geneva
Conventions of August 1949—which, even though they authorize exit as
“treaties that reflect core principles of international public policy,”53
49. MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 67 (1997).
See also Shelton, supra note 48, at 162.
50. Shelton, supra note 48, at 172-73 (“[J]us cogens is a necessary development in international
law, required because the modern independence of States demands an international ordre public
containing rules that require strict compliance.”).
51. See Simma & Alston, supra note 7.
52. OPPENHEIM’S, supra note 9, at 25 (§9); see also Charlesworth, supra note 17, at 12−15.
53. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 204. As does the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
729 U.N.T.S. 161:
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
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provide that denunciation of the Conventions “shall in no way impair the
obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by
virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the
dictates of public conscience.”54
The Geneva Conventions, then, do not envisage conventional
arrangements as operating in a normative vacuum, a space free of all other
constraints and regulations, but as belonging to an evolving and highly
intricate order that continues to bind parties to an international armed
conflict notwithstanding their status as High Contracting Parties to the
Geneva Conventions. The Conventions do this by appealing to the Martens
Clause,55 most famously expressed in the preamble to the 1899 Hague
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
Its Annex, and which provided that “[u]ntil a more complete code of the
laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare
that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of
public conscience.”56 This is done in the very provision that professes the
possibilities of denunciation of the Geneva Conventions; there is no
equivalent statement to appear in the provision regarding denunciation in

jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests (art. X (1)).
54. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 142, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. This provision, is, however, common to all four Geneva Conventions. See also
Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, art. 63, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
art. 62, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, and Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 158, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. See also Geneva Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, art. 99, June 8, 1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 3 and Geneva Protocol II Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts, art. 25, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. For their part, the High
Contracting Parties of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties affirmed in its preamble “that the
rules of customary international law will continue to govern questions not regulated by the provisions of
the present Convention.” VCLT, supra note 2, at pmbl. See also AUST, supra note 2, at 11-14.
55. See MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, I HOW DOES THE LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 132
(2d ed., 2006).
56. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land preamble, § 2,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803. The Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land were
attached as the Annex to the Convention.
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the First Additional Protocol (which carries the modern iteration of the
Martens Clause in the operative part of its text),57 or in the Second
Additional Protocol (which pays its homage to the clause in the penultimate
paragraph of its preamble).58
We see this holistic engagement with the formal sources of public
international law steadily at work in the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons in July 1996, where the Court was prepared to consider what it
called the “present corpus juris” of nuclear weapons in its entirety.59 It did
so by examining the conventional position on nuclear weapons before
turning to the position of custom on such weapons,60 where it took account
of the resolutions of the General Assembly; for the Court, these could hold
“normative value”61 in terms of the evidence they provide of the opinio
juris sive necessitatis of States,62 but also in terms of their actual content:
“that application,” by the General Assembly, in Resolution 1653 (XVI) of
November 24, 1961, “of general rules of customary law to the particular
case of nuclear weapons indicates that, in its view, there was no specific
rule of customary law which prohibited the use of nuclear weapons.”63 No
conventional or customary prohibition of nuclear weapons was found to
exist by the Court,64 but it then moved to consider the principles and rules
of international humanitarian law that were applicable.65 The Court spoke
of the “large number of customary rules” that had been developed by States
for the regulation of international armed conflicts as well as the neutral
57. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 54, art. 1(2).
58. And its manner of doing so—“that, in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person
remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience”—
has been taken to reflect the paucity of the customary regulation of non-international armed conflicts at
that point in time: in a notable reformulation of the Martens Clause in the Second Additional Protocol,
the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience are mentioned but “the usages
established between civilized nations” are not. Geneva Protocol II, supra note 54, at pmbl. See also
Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187,
209 (2000).
59. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 237
(July 8). See also William R. Hearn, The International Legal Regime Regulating Nuclear Deterrence
and Warfare, 61 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 199, 222-25 (1990) (discussing the derivation of customary
international law regarding the use of nuclear weapons from both State actions as well as State
statements of belief).
60. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 253.
61. Id. at 254.
62. Id. at 255.
63. Id. (“[I]f such a rule had existed, the General Assembly could simply have referred to it and
would not have needed to undertake such an exercise of legal qualification.”).
64. Id. at 256.
65. Id.
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relations of States for the duration of those armed conflicts (i.e. as between
belligerent States and non-belligerent States), before it made reference to “a
body of legal prescriptions”66 and “cardinal principles” that constituted
what the Court called “the fabric of [international] humanitarian law.”67
Those cardinal principles were identified as the principle of distinction
between combatants and non-combatants and the principle of unnecessary
suffering,68 and it is in this context that the Court formed its conclusion
that:
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the
human person and “elementary considerations of humanity” as the
Court put it in its Judgment . . . in the Corfu Channel case . . . that the
Hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession.
Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States
whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them,
because they constitute intransgressible principles of international
customary law.69

The Court was therefore approaching these “cardinal principles” from
the angle of their status as custom—hence “intransgressible principles of
international customary law.”70 At this precise moment, it was not
resorting to the patois of general principles of law—to Article 38 (1) (c) of
its Statute—to render the formal validity of the two principles that it had in
its sights,71 even though one is tempted to ask after the place and

66. Id. at 256-61.
67. Id. at 257.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 257.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. This is confirmed in the paragraphs immediately following the Court’s statement of
“intransgressible principles of international customary law,” where the Court invoked the conclusion of
the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal that the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land “were recognized by all civilized
nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war,” id. at 258 (quoting
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal), and the position of the
United Nations Secretary-General in introducing the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (where the Secretary-General
maintained that “the application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international
tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond doubt part of customary
law”), id. (quoting The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶¶ 34, 35, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (second emphasis
added). It is then that the Court delivered the following verdict:
The extensive codification of humanitarian law and the extent of the accession to the resultant
treaties, as well as the fact that the denunciation clauses that existed in the codification
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possibilities for general principles of law beyond mere “domestic
derivatives.”72 The fact of the Court’s quantification of both of these
international customs as “intransgressible”73 might suggest that the Court

instruments have never been used, have provided the international community with a corpus
of treaty rules the great majority of which had already become customary and which reflected
the most universally recognized humanitarian principles. These rules indicate the normal
conduct and behaviour expected of States.
Id. Consider, too, the position of the Court in its Nicaragua judgment when it concluded that “the
conduct of the United States may be judged according to the fundamental general principles of
humanitarian law; in its view, the Geneva Conventions are in some respects a development, and in other
respects no more than the expression, of such principles.” Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113 (June 27).
72. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 17-19 (discussing general principles of international law).
But could the principles under discussion truthfully qualify as “general” principles of law? As examples
of “this type of general principle,” Brownlie mentions the principles of consent, reciprocity, equality of
States, finality of awards and settlements, the legal validity of agreements, good faith, domestic
jurisdiction and the freedom of the high seas. Id. at 17. See also JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF
NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-29 (2003). The principle of proportionality might constitute another such
example, but, in its advisory opinion, the Court found that “[t]he submission of the exercise of the right
of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international
law.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 245. This
considers the “principle” of proportionality in the context of the jus ad bellum; as far as its relevance for
the jus in bello is concerned, the Court observed that “any right of recourse to [belligerent] reprisals
would, like self-defence, be governed inter alia by the principle of proportionality.” Id. at 246. But see
Christopher Greenwood, Jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note
21, at 261-62; see also JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 169 (2004). It is Judge Rosalyn Higgins who gave a fuller understanding of the function of the
principle of proportionality in respect of the jus in bello in her dissenting opinion, when she wrote: “The
principle of proportionality, even if finding no specific mention, is reflected in many provisions of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Thus even a legitimate target may not be
attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from
the attack.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 587
(dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins). To be sure, the Court had earlier said that “States must take
environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the
pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to
assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality.”
Legailty of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 242 (emphasis
added). The Court was addressing the matter of the protection of the environment during an armed
conflict.
73. Note that the Court later found that “international law leaves no doubt that the principle of
neutrality, whatever its content, which is of a fundamental character similar to that of the humanitarian
principles and rules, is applicable (subject to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter), to
all international armed conflict, whatever type of weapons might be used.” Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 261 (emphasis added). See also Luigi
Condorelli, International Humanitarian Law, Or the Court’s Explanation of a Terra Somewhat
Incognita To It, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, supra note 21, at 234.
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had deftly accorded them the ranking of jus cogens,74 and that it had
devised an imaginative vocabulary for conferring peremptory status upon
them for, whatever else this term might or might not mean, it would appear
to foreclose any possibilities of and for persistent objection to the customs
under discussion.75 However, an alternative reading of the dynamic of these
international customs would be that it is precisely because no State had
entered persistent objections to them during the period of their formation
that the Court felt the confidence to describe them as “intransgressible”—
that is that no State could lawfully transgress them, even as a prima facie
matter.76 In other words, the period for any permissible persistent objection
to these fundamental rules—or cardinal principles—of distinction and
unnecessary suffering had long since lapsed, and the Court reached this
conclusion without any apparent need for recourse to the concept of jus
cogens: it is then and only then, after its finding of the intransgressible
74. For such an intimation, consider Shelton, supra note 48, at 168 (“Whether ‘intransgressible’
means the rules are peremptory or only that they are general customary international law legally binding
on States not party to the conventions that contain them is uncertain.”). See also Werksman &
Khalastchi, supra note 47, at 183.
75. Ditto the “fundamental character” of the principle of neutrality. See Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 261. The International Committee of the
Red Cross took “no view” on the possibilities for persistent objection in its recent compendium on
customary international humanitarian law: I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW xxxix
(2005) (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds.). However, it also claimed, id. at 151, that
“[i]t appears that the United States is a ‘persistent objector’” to the first part of Rule 45 (“The use of
methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited”) and that France, the United Kingdom and the
United States “are persistent objectors with regard to the application of the first part of this rule to the
use of nuclear weapons.” Id. This latter statement is cast in much more concrete terms than the former
concerning only the United States, and does entail that the International Committee of the Red Cross
took a view on the possibilities of persistent objection to customary international humanitarian law:
France, the United Kingdom and the United States are here described as actual—rather than apparent—
persistent objectors. However, a few pages further into the study, the International Committee of the
Red Cross resumes its cautiousness and non-committal language, since these three States are described
as being:
specially affected as far as possession of nuclear weapons is concerned, and their objection to
the application of this specific rule [i.e. Rule 45] to such weapons has been consistent since
the adoption of this rule in treaty form in 1977. Therefore, if the doctrine of “persistent
objector” is possible in the context of humanitarian rules, these three States are not bound by
this specific rule as far as any use of nuclear weapons is concerned.
Id. at 154-55 (emphasis added). See also Camilla G. Guldhal, The Role of Persistent Objection in
International Humanitarian Law, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 51 (2008). On reasons why international
humanitarian law might not admit persistent objection, see Werksman & Khalastchi, supra note 47, at
194-96.
76. Perhaps a third possible interpretation of this controversial formulation is to regard it as
tautologous—as the Court saying no more than that the intransgressibility of these principles stems
from their status as customary international law, i.e. the principles are intransgressible by virtue of their
existence of custom—but it is not clear why the Court would have chosen to approach matters with a
statement of the obvious in quite this way.
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character of these principles of international custom,77 that the Court went
on to declare:
It has been maintained in these proceedings that these principles and
rules of [international] humanitarian law are part of jus cogens as
defined in . . . the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties . . . The
question whether a norm is part of the jus cogens relates to the legal
character of the norm. The request addressed to the Court by the
General Assembly raises the question of the of the applicability of the
principles and rules of [international] humanitarian law in cases of
recourse to nuclear weapons and the consequences of that applicability
for the legality of recourse to these weapons. But it does not raise the
question of the character of the [international] humanitarian law which
would apply to the use of nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no need
for the Court to pronounce on the matter.78

CONCLUSION
This short Article should give us some pause to reflect upon the
individuality of each of the formal sources of public international law as
presented in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice—and to conclude that, despite appearances and popular
perceptions, they are each governed by different sets of premises and
imperatives, and relate in different ways and with different nuances to the
concept of the consent of States.79 The International Court of Justice has
recognized this, most vividly in its decision in the Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua in June
1986, where it held that “even if the customary norm and the treaty norm
were to have exactly the same content, this would not be a reason for the
Court to hold that the incorporation of the customary norm into treaty law
must deprive the customary norm of its applicability as distinct from that of
the treaty norm.”80 We could say as much for the relationship between
international custom and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations,81 as we could the relationship between general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations and international conventions.82

77. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 267.
78. Id. at 258.
79. See, e.g., note 48.
80. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94-95 (June 27).
81. See Peter Hulsroj, Three Sources—No River, A Hard Look at the Sources of Public
International Law with Particular Emphasis on Custom and “General Principles of Law”, 54
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ÖFFENLICHES RECHT 219 (1999).
82. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (2d ed. 2005).
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Importantly, therefore, the formal sources of law exist and continue to exist
alongside one another, so that one “source” should not be pursued or
applied to the exclusion of other considerations or “sources,”83 and,
throughout, we should be alert to the possibilities of overlap or
coincidence.84 Within this framework, we have examined the possibilities
of and for persistent objection against international customs, an exercise
that has helped illuminate what the differences between and among the
formal sources of public international law might be, but, as outlined in the
preceding pages, it has also made plain the importance of further work in
calculating what these differences actually are, as well as why they are
what they are.

83. See Charlesworth, supra note 17, at 12-15; see also Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and
Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 717 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds.,
1989). Even within a conventional regime, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties envisages
that, for the purposes of treaty interpretation, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the
context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties” (Art. 31 (3)). VCLT, supra note 2, at
12-13.
84. In the Nicaragua Case, the Court found that “[t]he areas governed by the two sources of law .
. . do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content.” Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27).

